

MedGAN Progressive GAN CoGAN BIM LS-GAN AffGAN LAPGAN LSGAN InfoGAN McGAN FF-GAN MGAN C-VAE-GAN C-RNN-GAN SAGAN2018-07-24 CCGAN MAGAN 3D-GAN Adversarial Training **Bayesian GAN** SN-GAN EBGAN Context-RNN-GAN ALI f-GAN ArtGAN PGD




# Adversarial Machine Learning

## Traditional ML:



Minimum One player, one cost


### Adversarial ML: game theory



Equilibrium

More than one player, more than one cost






ML+neuroscience

Accountability and Transparency Fairness






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Accountability and Transparency Fairness




# Generative Modeling: Sample Generation



Training Data (CelebA)




### Sample Generator (Karras et al, 2017)



### (Goodfellow et al., 2014)



# 3.5 Years of Progress on Faces



2014

2015

2016

2017

### (Brundage et al, 2018)


(Goodfellow 2018)




# <2 Years of Progress on ImageNet

### Odena et al 2016

### Miyato et al 2017





### Zhang et al 2018






(Goodfellow 2018)



### GANs for simulated training data Unlabeled Real Images







### Synthetic





### Refined

(Shrivastava et al., 2016)



# Unsupervised Image-to-Image Translation





### Day to night

### (Liu et al., 2017)




# CycleGAN






### (Zhu et al., 2017)













# Personalized GANufacturing

### (Hwang et al 2018)



## Self-Attention GAN State of the art FID on ImageNet: 1000 categories, 128x128 pixels



Goldfish



Indigo Bunting



Redshank




Stone Wall





### Broccoli






### Tiger Cat



Saint Bernard

# Self-Attention







### Use layers from Wang et al 2018















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
Accountability and Transparency Fairness




# Adversarial Examples



 $+.007 \times$ 










# Also Adversarial Examples



(Eykholt et al, 2017)




(Goodfellow 2018)



# Adversarial Examples in the Physical World





(a) Image from dataset

(b) Clean image

(c) Adv. image,  $\epsilon = 4$  (d) Adv. image,  $\epsilon = 8$ 

### (Kurakin et al, 2016)



# Adversarial Training as a Minimax Problem


$$\boldsymbol{\theta}^* = \underset{\boldsymbol{\theta}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{x},y} \max_{\boldsymbol{\eta}} [J(\boldsymbol{x}, y, \eta)] = (J(\boldsymbol{x}, y, \eta))$$

with the learning algorithm as the minimizing player and a fixed procedure (such as L-BFGS or the fast gradient sign method) as the maximizing player."

- "Adversarial training can be interpreted as a minimax game,
  - $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ ) + J( $\boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{\eta}, \boldsymbol{y}$ )],


- Original implementation: <u>Goodfellow et al 2014</u>
- Explicit use of "minimax": Farley and Goodfellow, 2016





(CleverHans tutorial, using method of Goodfellow et al 2014)






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# Adversarial Examples for RL






 $(\underline{\text{Huang et al.}}, 2017)$ 




# Self-Play

### 1959: Arthur Samuel's checkers agent





### (OpenAI, 2017)



(Bansal et al, 2017)



## SPIRAL Synthesizing Programs for Images Using Reinforced Adversarial Learning


### Input Program end = [(9, 12), (3, 16), (17, 26), (30, 26), (30, 26), (30, 26), (20, 22), (16, 14), (30, 21), ...], <mark>ctl</mark> = [(8, 11), (8, 24), (3, → 25), (10, 25), (18, 25), (23, 25), (17, 21), (17, 22), (18, 22), ...], pen = [0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, Image 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0]

### (Ganin et al, 2018)

### Interpreters

### **Simulated Paint**








**Simulated Arm** 

**Real Arm** 





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
- We want extreme reliability for
  - Autonomous vehicles
  - Air traffic control
  - Surgery robots
  - Medical diagnosis, etc.

# Extreme Reliability

• Adversarial machine learning research techniques can help with this

• Katz et al 2017: verification system, applied to air traffic control






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
Accountability and Transparency Fairness



# Supervised Discriminator for Semi-Supervised Learning




(Odena 2016, Salimans et al 2016)




(Goodfellow 2018)

## Virtual Adversarial Training Miyato et al 2015: regularize for robustness to adversarial perturbations of

unlabeled data








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
Accountability and Transparency Fairness








# Privacy of training data






### Defining ( $\varepsilon$ , $\delta$ )-Differential Privacy



(Abadi 2017)




## Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles



### (Papernot et al 2016)





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### • Domain Adversarial Networks (Ganin et al, 2015)



### VIPER

• Professor forcing (Lamb et al, 2016): Domain-Adversarial learning in RNN hidden state


# Domain Adaptation

PRID

CUHK




## GANs for domain adaptation





(Bousmalis et al., 2016)





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


# Adversarially Learned Fair Representations

- Edwards and Storkey 2015
- Learn representations that are useful for classification
- make S impossible to recover
- Final decision does not depend on S

• An adversary tries to recover a sensitive variable Sfrom the representation. Primary learner tries to





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## How do machine learning models work?




(c) Grad-CAM 'Cat'





Interpretability literature: our analysis tools show that deep nets work about how you would expect them to.

(i) Grad-CAM 'Dog' (Selvaraju et al, 2016)




(Goodfellow et al, 2014)

Adversarial ML literature: ML models are very easy to fool and even linear models work in counter-intuitive ways.




## Robust models are more interpretable




Relatively vulnerable model

(Goodfellow 2015)



Relatively robust model





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## Adversarial Examples that Fool both Human and Computer Vision





### Gamaleldin et al 2018



# Questions

